The Formal Invariant
Interpretation: For any inference instance i, the cryptographic commitment to an AgDR package is logically equivalent to the emission of a result. No commitment, no output.
This invariant is enforced at the kernel boundary. It is not a logging policy. It is a type-level guarantee.
Note on provenance: Phoenix v1.8.0 is the first implementation to enforce atomic provenance binding per the AgDR specification. Earlier versions capture context metadata but do not satisfy the PPP Triplet atomicity requirement.
Core Principles
Cryptographic sealing is a gatekeeper, not a side-effect. The kernel cannot emit output without first committing to context.
If the kernel cannot sign the AgDR package, the inference result is discarded before reaching any API boundary.
Every outcome is mathematically traceable to its inputs, execution environment, and oversight chain, by design.
The PPP triplet binds each decision to accountable authority, ensuring decisions cannot be decoupled from their normative context.
AgDR Package Components
{
"ppp": {
"principal": "did:accountability:...",
"purpose": "credit_assessment_v2",
"permission": "cbc_s122_delegated"
},
"trace": "blake3:...",
"delta": { "state_before": "...", "state_after": "..." },
"commit": "ed25519:..."
}
Each field is cryptographically bound. Mutation of any component invalidates the signature.
Implementation Notes
The AKI invariant is enforced at the kernel boundary. Reference implementations prioritize:
- Memory safety: Rust-based kernel with zero-cost abstractions
- Deterministic cryptography: Ed25519 signatures, BLAKE3 hashing
- Verifiable scaling: Merkle tree commitments for O(log n) audit
- Interoperability: PyO3 bindings for Python integration
- Tamper-resistant timing: CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW for inference timestamps
Performance characteristics are documented separately to preserve the timelessness of this formal definition.